I hate both of these things, who knew I'd have so much in common with #JaneAusten 😂
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Rated The Three-Body Problem 10/10
An impressive mix of hard-ish Science Fiction and historical narratives, with a significant part of the plot set in Cultural Revolution-era China. Some of the present-day characters feel a bit unidimensional, but others get a treatment almost as good as the fascinating world-building done by the author, which becomes even clearer with the helpful translator's notes on cultural aspects. All in all, this is a great contemporary sci-fi opus which touches a theme that seems to be back in vogue: Humanity turning its collective focus (back?) to space and its mysteries.
Rated The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey 10/10
In this book, Michael Huemer aims to address one of the central questions of political philosophy: is there a legitimate source for the authority of a government? That question can be dismembered in two parts: first, whether there is a justification that allows government to impose to its subjects laws, even when they don't automatically follow from moral duties; second, whether the subjects have a duty to obey the laws created by the state.<br/><br/>Huemer dedicates the first chapter to an exploration of that question, by exploring the limitations usually established on political authority and delimiting the distinctive features of political authority. He also states his strategy: to start from (relatively) accepted concepts instead of applying a specific theoretical framework as a basis for his criticism of political authority.<br/><br/>In chapter 2, the author discusses the traditional theories of social contract. He divides the traditional contractualist accounts of political authorities: explicit versions, that refer to an actual contract accepted by the citizens as the source of authority, and implicit theories, which define certain social behaviours as implicit acceptance of a social contract. Explicit theories, such as the Lockean vision, are given an analysis that, while brief, is still enough to show their shortcomings, especially in the inter-generational question. The author then changes his focus to the analysis of implicit social contract theories, arguing that the claims of an implicit acceptance of the social contract fail to meet the criteria usually established for valid consent (for example, the existence of a reasonable opt-out as an alternative to the acceptance of the contract).<br/><br/>An alternate model of social contracts forsakes the question of an actual contract altogether, basing political authority on the hypothesis that "individuals *would* consent to the state under certain hypothetical conditions.". Chapter 3 is dedicated to the analysis of such models, popularized by Rawls, Scanlon and others; there, the author argues that switching from actual to hypothetical consenting fails to provide a justification for political authority, since it falls short of the usual criteria for consent. This is due, in part, to the fact that rational disagreement is possible even if one accounts for all differences motivated by circumstances, as argued by Berlin (value pluralism) and others.<br/><br/>After presenting his arguments that neither actual nor hypothetical consent provide an adequate source for political authority, the book then switches its focus to the idea that, even if it is not possible to obtain the consent of every citizen, the will of a majority is by itself strong enough to generate obligations to the whole of the population. Chapter 4, therefore, deals with deliberative democracy, that, while having many merits -- especially when compared with other proposed models of government --, still fails to offer an acceptable basis for either political obligation or political legitimacy.<br/><br/>Chapter 5 addresses consequentialist narratives of political authority. While those narratives manage to justify some (but not even most) of the roles claimed by the state (especially security and justice), they nevertheless fail to provide the context-independent and comprehensive basis required for authority, while also failing to make a solid claim for the monopolies of the state. If something has consequences good enough to justify the state acting in a certain way, consequentialist narratives do not establish beyond doubt that a non-state actor could not achieve the same goals. For example, a government would have no legitimacy to prevent a NGO from punishing criminals, provided it follows the same laws and procedures that the state would follow; arguing that the state has unique prerogatives, here, would be circular reasoning, since that's what one intends to establish in the first place.<br/><br/>After pointing the weaknesses on the traditional philosophical accounts of political authority, the author then follows with the best chapter on the book: a survey of what psychological science can tell us about political authority. Through references to many known (and studied) psychological phenomena, it shows that our political intuitions are subject to many cognitive biases that can make people liable to accepting otherwise illegitimate authority. Based on this, and on his ethical intuitionism, the author claims that the conclusions of the previous chapters show that political authority lacks the solid grounding usually associated with it. Here I must make a special mention of Huemer's discussion of the formal aspects of authority, a topic sadly ignored by much of the libertarian literature.<br/><br/>Given that the first chapters present a serious case against political authority, an obvious question follows: "if that holds, then what?"<br/>Chapter 7 begins to answer that question, by addressing what a state could legitimately do and how it can act. It also addresses how government agents and other citizens could act against unjust state action -- considering both non-violent and violent resistance -- and answers some possible objections against such courses of resistance.<br/><br/>After establishing that the usual accounts of political authority lack the solidity that would be necessary to justify the extent of the powers conferred upon the modern national state, the second part of the book is dedicated to the exploration of how a society without political authority could function. It begins with Chapter 8, where some of the relevant criteria for the evaluation of social models are discussed. Based on the analysis done until this point, the author establishes a simplified model of human nature as a starting point for his analysis: humans are approximately rational (despite their biases, they usually act in a way consistent with their goals an beliefs), relatively selfish (that is, not entirely devoid of morality and bonds with other people) and aware of their environment. The chapter finishes with a discussion of utopianism and realism, setting for Part II the aim of establishing a realist market anarchist framework.<br/><br/>Chapter 9 discusses the problem of political predation, opposing Hobbes's claim that the government would provide protection from the "war of all against all". To make his point, Huemer argues that not only the absence of a state would not turn interpersonal violence into a rational choice (especially when one takes into account cultural factors), but also that states give means for oppression. For totalitarian states, the latter claim is pretty straightforward; one could spend a life enumerating the cases of dictators using the machinery of government for their own enrichment. Based on the insights of Public Choice theory, the author takes the claim further, by arguing that even democracies can be tools for predation, be it from majorities against minorities, from voters against non-voters or from special interest groups with disproportionate influence. To make things worse, the usual mechanisms that democracies use to prevent such risks -- activism, media exposition, and constitutional checks -- fail to prevent the misuse of political authority; they may mitigate the problem, but not eliminate it altogether.<br/><br/>The following chapters discuss how a market anarchist society could provide security and justice to its citizens. Huemer's answer to that involves a system of private protection agencies to provide physical and material security to its clients, and arbitration firms to solve disputes between individuals and between companies. Such businesses, unlike their government counterparts, would not have a monopoly; instead, they would compete in the market for clients, which could choose services more adequate to their needs. The barriers for entrance in such markets would be very small (for example, forming a local militia or being recognized locally as a fair judge); since it would not be feasible to maintain a monopoly, the companies would need to be more responsive to their clients, therefore providing services more adequate to the needs and means of customers. Since reputation would play an important role in such markets, companies would have economical stimuli to be as transparent and fair as possible, in order to retain their clients.<br/><br/>A major objection to such a scheme comes from the possibility of conflict between protection agencies; in fact, authors have claimed that such a fragmentation of power would make conflict more likely. While Chapter 10 argues that protection agencies would not have incentives to fight one another, Chapter 12 presents a more significant response to the such objections, pointing out that the smaller scale of those agencies would result in less destructive conflicts than the ones between militarized states. More than that: the author points out how the needs of "national defence" proposed by realist literature in fact may lead to increased security risks, and how even societies without standing armies could resist an invasion through non-violent resistance or guerilla warfare. The chapter also proposes conditions in which a market anarchist society could peacefully thrive, inspired on Kant's "democratic peace". While the chapter addresses many of the theoretical questions of international security, it understate some of the threats, such as the massive cost imposed upon civilians by even a successful guerilla campaign, and the relevance of weapons of mass destruction, which can increase considerably the potential harm that comes from a conflict. <br/><br/>Chapter 13 presents a feasible, if optimistic, model for transition: the emergence of competing, viable alternatives to essential state functions, followed by bottom-up privatization fueled by cultural change. The optimism is based on a certain -- and debatable -- view of human progress; that view, however, falls short of the error of treating progress as a linear, inevitable historical process. The book ends with a summary of the main points of both parts, concluding that not only political authority is not as solid as usually thought, but it is also unnecessary for the functioning of society.<br/><br/>The book is at its best while dismantling the justificatory discourses of political authority, presenting not only a tight argumentation but also solid real-world evidence. When the book moves into the positive aspect of its proposal, the problems begin to appear: not that the arguments get any less solid, but they leave many open questions, especially in practical terms. While that's a reflex both of the priorities of libertarian scholarship and the speculation inherent to the exploratory purpose of Part II, Huemer's interdisciplinary approach is very instructive, both in its strengths and its weaknesses, by showing a mostly cohesive framework that can be improved. Combined with the power of Part I, this makes "The Problem of Political Authority" a very instructing book and a must-read for a general perspective on contemporary market anarchist thought.
Open Book Fountain
This sculpture was created by Kelecsenyi Gergely & engineer Jozsef Szita.
The fountain uses water to create the illusion of turning pages, and serves as a reminder of the importance of physical books.
Location: Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary. On Egyetem Square, in front of the university.
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Finished reading The Goblin Emperor
Added Riot Baby to Want to Read
Finished reading The Sentient
Rated Rosewater 6/10
Strong setting and characters but a confusingly and disjointedly told story where there wasn't enough distinction between the Now and the Then periods.
Rated The Fault in Our Stars 10/10
Finished reading Monstrous Regiment
